

# Fixed Income Update Week 39

Jacob Skinhøj  
Peter Bache  
Veronica Bergstrøm


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
# Time for reinvestment performance?

- At first glance, October prepayments are too small to generate reinvestment performance.
- Yet we expect reinvestment performance of at least 4bp this time.
- Over the past few years, we have needed average payments of more than DKK 25 billion, including principal payments, interest rates and coupon payments, to generate reinvestment performance.
- This time, payments will only be at DKK 14.7 billion in principal payments and redemptions, and DKK 22 billion including coupon payments.
- Our expectation of reinvestment performance nevertheless reflects the uncertainty surrounding the current issuance coupon and resulting record-low issuance of callables.
- So, even though the payments are low, current issuance is, broadly speaking, even lower.

## Reinvestment performance in callables




## Correlation between the size of prepayments and OAS



## 4'56 – from issuance to buyback status


- While 4'56 remained open for issuance, issuers could offset buybacks directly against current issuance.
- After the closing of 4'56, however, any buybacks must be covered through purchases in the market.
- At current price levels, we believe buybacks are primarily attributable to redemptions associated with change of ownership.
- The key question, therefore, is the scale of the underlying buyback activity in the 4% segment.
- Measured from 1 September, buyback activity has been substantial, corresponding to an annualised rate of just under 9% of the outstanding amount.
- However, this elevated level is largely driven by a significant cancellation during the first week following the closure. This most likely reflects a technical cleanup of previously issued bonds that ultimately did not give rise to underlying lending activity.
- Excluding this first week, buyback activity has been considerably more moderate and corresponds to an annualised rate of approx 4.5%.
- Accordingly, we believe that around 4.5% represents a more reliable estimate of the current underlying buyback activity in the 4% segment.




# Prospect of buyback surge in 4'56?

- The recent price decline has raised the question of whether there is scope for a large-scale buyback surge in 4'56 bonds.
  - In 2022, a very substantial share of the low-coupon callables was bought back, with activity unfolding in three distinct waves that coincided with the price of 1'50A reaching 90, 80 and 75, respectively.
- First and foremost, the 4'56 bond has so far only fallen to just below a price of 96. This means that a considerably larger decline in price would likely be required before a genuine buyback surge becomes a realistic prospect.
- Should the 4'56 bond fall to a price of 90, several factors would influence the magnitude of any subsequent buyback surge.
  - One of the key drivers behind the significant buybacks observed in 2022 was not merely the opportunity to reduce outstanding debt, but also the potential of reducing mortgage payments.
  - The chart above illustrates the *immediate* after-tax payment saving from buying back a fixed-rate 1% loan of DKK 1 million, originated on 1 July 2021, and refinancing into either a 3Y bullet loan or an F-kort loan.
  - At origination, the saving from choosing a 3Y bullet loan or FRNs rather than a fixed-rate mortgage loan amounted to DKK 100-200. During 2022, however, this increased to almost DKK 1,000. The primary reason was the sharp decline in the price of 1'50, which enabled borrowers to reduce their outstanding debt, while FRN coupons rose only marginally and remained broadly unchanged even after the mid-2022 refixing.
  - So far, the decline in 4'56 has not occurred in a way that has materially increased the payment saving relative to the original borrowing date for a homeowner who took out a DKK 1 million 4'56 loan in August 2025 – quite the opposite (see the lower chart).
  - For further price declines in 4'56 to generate genuinely sizeable buyback potential, those declines would thus need to occur without simultaneously increasing the funding costs of short-term interest rate products (different from the pattern observed thus far).

Savings by switching from 1'50 to FRNs/bullets (originated on 1



Savings by switching from 4'56 to FRNs/bullets (originated on 1 August 2025)




# Relatively modest end-of-quarter issuance

- We expect the end-of-quarter issuance to be relatively modest.
- This is partly due to the smaller outstanding volume stemming from the August refinancing auctions of DKK 3.5 billion, and partly due to lower redemptions in the callable segment of DKK 7 billion.
- Overall, we expect end-of-quarter issuance to total approx DKK 6-8 billion, with the bulk of the activity likely to take place on Monday and Tuesday next week, 28 and 29 September, respectively.
- As was the case in June, we believe end-of-quarter issuance will be dominated by FRNs.
- The relative cost difference between the various loan types is broadly unchanged from the levels observed in June.
- At the same time, if anything, the increase in interest rates over the past couple of weeks may encourage a greater number of borrowers to opt for variable-rate loans on the expectation that rates will decline again over time.
- Accordingly, we expect:
  - FRNs: DKK 4-5 billion
  - Bullets: DKK 2-3 billion
  - ~ DKK 1 billion-worth of callables


| Expected end-of-quarter issuance |                        |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|
| FRNs                             | DKK 4-5 billion        |
| Bullets                          | DKK 2-3 billion        |
| Callables                        | < DKK 1 billion        |
| <b>Total</b>                     | <b>DKK 6-8 billion</b> |

## Yields and coupons adjusted for margins etc



# Liquidity ahead in September


- The net position is currently just over DKK 10 billion ahead of the daily forecast (adjusted for actual issuance).
  - In recent months, however, we have seen a pattern where the net position tends to lose momentum relative to the forecast towards the end of the month.
  - As a result, we do not expect the net position to finish the month more than around DKK 5 billion above the level implied by the forecast.
  - As previously discussed in , there remains considerable uncertainty surrounding where the net position will end the year, and therefore what the starting point for 2027 will be.
- At present, one-year bullets appear to be priced on the assumption that the net position will increase by as much as DKK 350 billion between now and year-end.
  - We believe investors are likely to be disappointed. Consequently, we see scope for one-year bullets to widen by up to 5bp in spread from current levels.




# Bullets: More 5Y bullets on the way

- Issuance of 5Y bullets was moderate in Q3 and slightly lower than in the preceding three quarters.
- We expect issuance of 5Y bullets to pick up somewhat in October (and throughout the remainder of Q4).
  - This is mainly because about DKK 63.5 billion-worth of originally 5Y bullets maturing at the January payment date (see [here](#)), together with a sizeable auction offering in November, may generate refinancing-related flows outside the auction process.
  - Part of this refinancing activity outside the auctions is likely to materialise in the run-up to the prepayment deadline at the end of October.
- Offsetting this, however, is the reduced flow from fixed-to-variable refinancing out of 5% callables, which have now become fairly limited in scale.
  - That said, the same was broadly true during the second quarter, and we no longer view fixed-to-variable refinancing as the primary driver of movements in the issuance of 5Y bullets.
- Setting aside the relatively short-lived performance rally seen in early August, bullet spreads have generally remained stable since May.
  - Looking ahead, we believe that the combination of increased supply and evolving liquidity conditions could lead to modest spread widening in the bullet segment over the coming months. For longer-dated bullets, however, it will most likely not be until 2027 that liquidity conditions begin to represent a meaningful headwind.

## 5Y bullet issuance may be picking up again in Q4




## Bullet spreads vs DEST R overall gone sideways since May



# FRNs: Interest rate tailwinds for issuance?

- Overall, FRN issuance has declined relative to the second quarter, although activity has regained some momentum in recent weeks.
  - The segment has likely been supported by the recent rise in interest rates, which has, at least so far, had a more pronounced impact on the payment of fixed-rate mortgages and 1Y and 5Y loans.
- Since 2022, we have observed greater focus on presenting borrowers with an illustration of what the payments on an FRN-funded loan would be if the coupon was hypothetically reset based on the current level of the reference rate, particularly when such a calculation would imply a higher coupon.
  - This reduces the potential for a significant boost to FRN issuance arising from the fact that FRN coupons temporarily lag behind the pricing of other mortgage products (see the chart below).
  - Nevertheless, we still expect this effect to provide some incremental support for FRN issuance during the fourth quarter.
- That said, we do not expect any additional FRN issuance to be of a magnitude that would exert meaningful pressure on FRN-bullet spreads.
- Approximately DKK 62.5 billion-worth of FRNs issued by NDA, NYK and DLR mature at the January refinancing date. The maturity profile is distributed largely equally between CITA 6M and CIBOR 6M-linked FRNs (see [here](#)).
  - This points to anticipated FRN auction offering of around DKK 56-58 billion.

## FRN issuance may pick up a bit in Q4



## Yields and coupons adjusted for margins etc




# New 5% bonds – almost here, yet not quite

- Last week, all issuers (except DLR) announced the opening of new 5'59 bonds.
- On Thursday, JRK conducted the first tap of its 5% 2059 A bond at a price of 100.30. On Friday morning, NDA followed with a tap of its 5% 2059 interest-only bond at 100.00.
- We believe issuance in the period ahead may shift back and forth between 4'59 and 5'59 (with 5'59 IO bonds being used by those issuers that fund amortising repayment loans through interest-only funding series).
- All else equal, this would imply a slower build-up of the new benchmark series and, consequently, a longer path towards achieving index representation.
- In our view, this argues for a larger "maturity class premium" across all of the newly opened series.
- For the 5% bonds specifically, there is also a risk that they ultimately remain relatively small issues with a high concentration of large loan balances. This supports a higher OAS relative to 4'59 bonds.
- We therefore find the new 5% bonds reasonably attractive if they come at a higher OAS than 4'59 bonds. Investors should, however, pay close attention to the actual borrower distribution, as the eventual composition of these series may become apparent fairly quickly.
- Legacy 5% bonds have widened by around 15-20% following the launch of the new 5% series. It is possible that they may recover some of this underperformance, reflecting the uncertainty that previously existed regarding whether any new 5% series would be launched at all.

ISINs of the newly opened bonds

|     | 5'59    | 5'59IO | 5'59IO30 | 4'49   |
|-----|---------|--------|----------|--------|
| NYK | 955620  | 955639 | 955647   | 955655 |
| RD  | 463566  | 463574 | N/A      | 463558 |
| NDA | 206660  | 206679 | 206687   | 206695 |
| JRK | 942,081 | 942103 | 942111   | 942138 |


30Y callables: OAS swaps




# 4% vs longer-dated bullets

- Last Monday, we argued that longer-dated bullets had begun to look expensive and that 4% callables appeared attractive on a relative-value basis.
- Over the course of the week, bullet bonds also came under pressure, with longer-dated issues widening by around 1.5bp in spread, while the 4% segment gained ground over the week (true for both 4'56 and 4'59).
- As a result, the relative valuation between longer-dated bullets and callables now appears more balanced, particularly in the case of 4% 2056 bonds versus 5Y bullets.
- That said, we continue to believe that longer-dated bullets may underperform further over the coming months, and to the extent that investors are able to source 4% 2059 bonds at an OAS of around zero, we continue to see value in the recommendation.

OAS Price 98 Callable vs. Gen 5Y Bullet (Start 18 Sep 24)




Bullets: Spreads vs DEST R




# DGB

- We continue to see the highest expected 12-month HPR in DGB 2035, with DGB 2033 following closely behind.
- These two bonds are also where we currently identify the most compelling relative value opportunities.
- Foreign investors appear to share this assessment and now hold approximately 50% of each issue.
- So far, September's favourable rate movements have had little impact on the DGB-DBR yield spread. Around 10Y, the spread has remained broadly unchanged at approximately -18bp.
- The uncertainty surrounding Germany's political situation is, in isolation, supportive of Danish government bonds relative to Bunds, while any renewed bout of interest-rate volatility would, at least initially, be expected to favour German Bunds.

DGB 12M HPR, 12M roll & YTM



DGB 12M HPR, 12M roll & YTM



# Recommendations

- Our recommendation of holding 4'56 against a barbell of 5% bonds and low-coupon callables has recovered part of its earlier underperformance following the spread widening in the legacy 5% bonds.
- We do not expect the legacy 5% bonds to cheapen further from current levels and therefore close the recommendation out of the money.
- Our newer recommendation of 4'59 vs 5Y bullets has rebounded well after a difficult start. We still see value in the recommendation and maintain it.
- We also maintain our other recommendations.


## Current recommendations

| Opening date | Name                     | Return 1bd | Return 5bd | Total (incl. costs) |
|--------------|--------------------------|------------|------------|---------------------|
| 2026-06-01   | RD 4'56IO vs NYK 4'56IO  | 0.04       | 0.04       | 0.07                |
| 2026-06-15   | DGBI'34 vs DGBI'30 (BOX) | -0.12      | -0.14      | -1.55               |
| 2026-07-07   | 4'56 vs 1'50 & 5'53      | 0.05       | 0.46       | -0.40               |
| 2026-08-21   | 3Y FRN vs RTL            | 0.01       | -0.02      | -0.00               |
| 2026-09-03   | RTL5 vs RTL1 (hedged)    | -0.01      | -0.08      | -0.07               |
| 2026-09-02   | 1'59 vs 4'59             | -0.30      | -0.62      | -0.46               |
| 2026-09-10   | 4'59 vs. RTL5            | 0.44       | 0.95       | 0.50                |

## Outlook recommendations

| Opening date | Name                                | Return 1bd | Return 5bd | Total (incl. costs) |
|--------------|-------------------------------------|------------|------------|---------------------|
| 2025-08-25   | CITA vs CIBOR 3M FRN                | 0.00       | -0.01      | -0.00               |
| 2025-11-27   | CIBOR 6M vs CIBOR 3M FRN            | 0.00       | 0.04       | 0.13                |
| 2026-01-15   | NYK 4'56 vs RD 5'56 + JRK 1.5'53 IO | 0.02       | 0.64       | -0.89               |
| 2026-01-26   | 4'56 vs RTL5                        | 0.30       | 0.82       | 0.48                |

## Recommendation: 4.5Y German Covered Bonds vs bullets (vs ESTR via ba



# Nykredit

## markets

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BUY: In our view, the bond pricing is fairly cheap relative to comparable alternatives in either the bond or the derivatives market. We expect that the bond will offer a higher return than any alternatives on a horizon of typically three months.

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| Recommendation |     |
|----------------|-----|
| Buy            | 50% |
| Sell           | 50% |

As at 13.12.2024  
Note: Distribution of our recommendations, which therefore add up to 100%.

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Nykredit Bank A/S – Sundkrogs­gade 25 – DK-2150 Nordhavn – Tel +45 44 55 10 00 – Fax +45 33 12 04 34